I study asset pricing when there is risk of re-sell in general and interconnected market structures. In my framework, a divisible asset can be acquired at a common price by risk-averse traders, who may then need to re-sell their shares in their local trading network. I develop two novel network metrics that define equilibrium variables. Trading centrality is a sufficient statistic for asset price and demands, while local centrality determines liquidity costs. Both measures map expected re-sale market outcomes into the traders' decision of asset acquisition before re-trade. A trader’s demand is proportional to his trading centrality, and his re-selling cost is always positive and increasing in his local centrality. The unique exception is for the core trader in a star network who obtains profits from re-selling. Asset price and welfare are non-monotonic in connectivity and inequality of traders' number of connections. Implications for the interdealer market of off-exchange securities are examined.